Politics and war midterm
34 flashcards · Politics · by Madi Butler
Criteria for a good theory (6)
1. Logical consistency 2. Accuracy 3. Falsifiable 4. nonspurious (Correlation and causation) 5. Parsimony (simplicity) 6. Heuristic ability (fruitfulness) 7. Organizing power
Walz Levels of analysis
Individuals the state the international system
Dyadic level of analysis
focus on pairs of states because it takes two states to fight-- two to form an alliance etc.
Factors in creating dangerous Dyads ranked (6)
Contiguity no alliance Less advanced economy Absence of Democratic Polity (Democracies are more peaceful--Not true tho) absence of preponderance (more likely to fight if one is more powerful than the other) Presence of a major power
Process of war (4)
contextual factors conflict of interest militarized interstate disputes interstate wars back to contextual factors
process of war, dangerous dyads Author
Bremer
tripple entente
Britain France Russia
triple alliance
Germany Austria-Hungary Italy
Central Powers
Germany Austria-hungary Ottomon empire
Interstate war 4 qualifications
fighting between the regular military forces of two or more countries, directed and aproved by central authorities, where at least one thousand battle deaths oocur
Extrastate war and two types
when a state fights a war outside of its borders against a non-state actor Type 2 Colonial: fighting against a colony that is their colony Type 3 Imperia: fighting against colony that isnt theirs
Intrastate war and 3 types
between state and non-state actors within the territory of a state. A: Civil wars B: Regional Internal: C: Intercommunal: govt. not involved at all. different factions in the state are fighting against one another
Civil war types
A: Civil wars For central Control (overthrow govt) Spanish civil war 2. local issues (modify govt) American Civil war.
Regional internal war
Regional Internal: does not involve National government-- Involves regional govt fighting with non-state actors (mao attacks regional army to bring them under control of central govt. during cultural revolution)
Intercommunal war
C: Intercommunal: govt. not involved at all. different factions in the state are fighting against one another
Militarized interstate dispute (3)
Set of interactions between or among nations must be explicit, overt, non-coincidental, and government sanctioned 1) the threat to use force 2) the display of force or 3) the actual use of military forc
threats to use force
threats to: to fire on another nations armed forces to blockade another states territory to occupy another states armed forces
display of force
putting armed forces on alert mobilizing armed forces public demonstrations--sailing warships off the coast of another state
Use of force
firing weapons initiating blockade occupying territory
Hostility levels in MID's (5)
no militarized action threat to use force display of force use of force war
nonstate wars (2)
non state actors fighting against each other outside of a particular states borders. A: In a non state territory (Palestine war) B: across state borders
Rational choice theory theorist
mesquita
Instrumental rationality
when confronted with two alternatives that give rise to outcomes.. they will choose the on that yields the most preferred outcome always make choices they believe are consistent with their interests. no normative judgements of good or evil
Expected utility theory (3)
model of rational decision making We must know: (1) possible choices that could be made (2) the possible outcomes (3) players Utility (preference) for the different outcomes (4) probability or likelihood that different outcomes will occur in some situation
Measuring utility (2)
Ordinal level: two options, prefer winning a war to losing a war Cardinal level: continuous scale winning a war = 1000 losing = -500 peace=250
expected utility
multiply utility of outcomes by probability that they will happen p(win)U(win)+p(lose)U(lose) 0.5(500)+0.5(-1000) 250-500 = -250 attacking has a negative utility of -250 states will only initiate conflict if utility is less than zero
Composite indicator of National capabilities
if a state has 60% of the power within a dyad probabliity of winning =.6
Alliance portfolio
entire configuration of alliance commitments to other states if states share allies -- more in common less likely to fight
Mesquita's thepry
expected utility theory of int conflict is well supported by historical record empirical support for the basic logic of expected utility theory and retional choice. Flaw: it does not account for strategic interactions between decision makers -- focuses on each actors choice in a vaccum
International interaction game assumptions (4)
decision makers are instrumentally rational negotiations and war involve a lottery in which each player has a chance to win or lose with some probability achieving ones demands represents a gain from the status quo each outcome has a set of costs, benefits or both associated with it
International interaction game outcome values and players (5)
8 different outcomes. most preferred = value of 8 Least preferred = value of 1 hawk= state that like to use force dove= state that prefers to negotiate with its opponent retaliator= prefers to respond to attack with war surrenderer= prefers to give in rather than fight pacific dove= both a dove and a surrenderer
Bargaining model of war
war is costly so why do that shit
Fearon bargaining model
as long as war is costly some bargin should exist that both sides would prefer to actually fighting Key: p= probability of wining the war a= expected costs for state A b= expected costs for state B X= indicates the share of good for each state
bargaining failure three sources
incomplete information commitment problems indivisible issues