Politics and war midterm

34 flashcards · Politics · by Madi Butler

  1. Criteria for a good theory (6)

    1. Logical consistency 2. Accuracy 3. Falsifiable 4. nonspurious (Correlation and causation) 5. Parsimony (simplicity) 6. Heuristic ability (fruitfulness) 7. Organizing power

  2. Walz Levels of analysis

    Individuals the state the international system

  3. Dyadic level of analysis

    focus on pairs of states because it takes two states to fight-- two to form an alliance etc.

  4. Factors in creating dangerous Dyads ranked (6)

    Contiguity no alliance Less advanced economy Absence of Democratic Polity (Democracies are more peaceful--Not true tho) absence of preponderance (more likely to fight if one is more powerful than the other) Presence of a major power

  5. Process of war (4)

    contextual factors conflict of interest militarized interstate disputes interstate wars back to contextual factors

  6. process of war, dangerous dyads Author

    Bremer

  7. tripple entente

    Britain France Russia

  8. triple alliance

    Germany Austria-Hungary Italy

  9. Central Powers

    Germany Austria-hungary Ottomon empire

  10. Interstate war 4 qualifications

    fighting between the regular military forces of two or more countries, directed and aproved by central authorities, where at least one thousand battle deaths oocur

  11. Extrastate war and two types

    when a state fights a war outside of its borders against a non-state actor Type 2 Colonial: fighting against a colony that is their colony Type 3 Imperia: fighting against colony that isnt theirs

  12. Intrastate war and 3 types

    between state and non-state actors within the territory of a state. A: Civil wars B: Regional Internal: C: Intercommunal: govt. not involved at all. different factions in the state are fighting against one another

  13. Civil war types

    A: Civil wars For central Control (overthrow govt) Spanish civil war 2. local issues (modify govt) American Civil war.

  14. Regional internal war

    Regional Internal: does not involve National government-- Involves regional govt fighting with non-state actors (mao attacks regional army to bring them under control of central govt. during cultural revolution)

  15. Intercommunal war

    C: Intercommunal: govt. not involved at all. different factions in the state are fighting against one another

  16. Militarized interstate dispute (3)

    Set of interactions between or among nations must be explicit, overt, non-coincidental, and government sanctioned 1) the threat to use force 2) the display of force or 3) the actual use of military forc

  17. threats to use force

    threats to: to fire on another nations armed forces to blockade another states territory to occupy another states armed forces

  18. display of force

    putting armed forces on alert mobilizing armed forces public demonstrations--sailing warships off the coast of another state

  19. Use of force

    firing weapons initiating blockade occupying territory

  20. Hostility levels in MID's (5)

    no militarized action threat to use force display of force use of force war

  21. nonstate wars (2)

    non state actors fighting against each other outside of a particular states borders. A: In a non state territory (Palestine war) B: across state borders

  22. Rational choice theory theorist

    mesquita

  23. Instrumental rationality

    when confronted with two alternatives that give rise to outcomes.. they will choose the on that yields the most preferred outcome always make choices they believe are consistent with their interests. no normative judgements of good or evil

  24. Expected utility theory (3)

    model of rational decision making We must know: (1) possible choices that could be made (2) the possible outcomes (3) players Utility (preference) for the different outcomes (4) probability or likelihood that different outcomes will occur in some situation

  25. Measuring utility (2)

    Ordinal level: two options, prefer winning a war to losing a war Cardinal level: continuous scale winning a war = 1000 losing = -500 peace=250

  26. expected utility

    multiply utility of outcomes by probability that they will happen p(win)U(win)+p(lose)U(lose) 0.5(500)+0.5(-1000) 250-500 = -250 attacking has a negative utility of -250 states will only initiate conflict if utility is less than zero

  27. Composite indicator of National capabilities

    if a state has 60% of the power within a dyad probabliity of winning =.6

  28. Alliance portfolio

    entire configuration of alliance commitments to other states if states share allies -- more in common less likely to fight

  29. Mesquita's thepry

    expected utility theory of int conflict is well supported by historical record empirical support for the basic logic of expected utility theory and retional choice. Flaw: it does not account for strategic interactions between decision makers -- focuses on each actors choice in a vaccum

  30. International interaction game assumptions (4)

    decision makers are instrumentally rational negotiations and war involve a lottery in which each player has a chance to win or lose with some probability achieving ones demands represents a gain from the status quo each outcome has a set of costs, benefits or both associated with it

  31. International interaction game outcome values and players (5)

    8 different outcomes. most preferred = value of 8 Least preferred = value of 1 hawk= state that like to use force dove= state that prefers to negotiate with its opponent retaliator= prefers to respond to attack with war surrenderer= prefers to give in rather than fight pacific dove= both a dove and a surrenderer

  32. Bargaining model of war

    war is costly so why do that shit

  33. Fearon bargaining model

    as long as war is costly some bargin should exist that both sides would prefer to actually fighting Key: p= probability of wining the war a= expected costs for state A b= expected costs for state B X= indicates the share of good for each state

  34. bargaining failure three sources

    incomplete information commitment problems indivisible issues